INTRODUCTION
In talks given early in the 1990s, Jean-Michel Grandmont (1998) introduced the concept of the self-fulfilling mistake. This phenomenon can emerge when economic agents cannot distinguish between randomness and determinism, a situation that can occur when the underlying true dynamics are chaotic (Radunskaya, 1994) , although such a situation could arise with other forms of complex nonlinear dynamics besides those involving chaotic dynamics. In such a situation, agents may be unable to discern the true dynamics and may adopt simple, boundedly rational "rules of thumb" based on some kind of backward-looking adaptive expectations (Bullard, 1994) . For certain kinds of underlying processes, agents may be able to mimic the actual dynamics with such an "incorrect" behavioral rule, an outcome known as a consistent expectations equilibrium (CEE), a concept formalized by Hommes (1998) as meaning that the two processes have identical means and also autocorrelation coefficients at all leads and lags. Sorger (1998) and Hommes and Sorger (1998) have shown how in some cases agents can learn to converge on such CEEs, or self-filfillingly mistaken behavior. These models all involve discrete dynamics. The first realization that a discrete chaotic dynamic could be mimicked by a simple linear autocorrelation function is due to Bunow and Weiss (1979) and Sakai and Tokumaru (1980) , the latter demonstrating the possibility for the case of the asymmetric tent map, a result studied in more depth by Brock and Dechert (1991) and Radunskaya (1994) .
Several models have now been studied which can lead to such results, although the full implications of this possibility have not been worked out in all such cases. Among macroeconomic examples are that of Sorger (1998) In microeconomics it has long been understood that cobweb adjustment models can generate chaotic dynamics in a broad array of situations (Chiarella, 1988; Hommes, 1991 (Grandmont, 1985) that the possibility of chaotic dynamics undermines the possibility of forming rational expectations, expectations that are accurate on average, because of the problem of sensitive dependence on initial conditions in a noisy economic environment. But the possibility of consistent expectations equilibria raises the possibility that agents might well be able to act as if they have rational expectations even when they do not in a chaotic universe. Such a possibility raises hope for optimism about the potential for optimal and stable behavior in markets where such behavior is not at all evident, as in many fisheries.
On the other hand it must be recognized that these results appear to hold only for certain types of true underlying discrete dynamical processes. It is currently unknown and remains a topic for future research just how widespread such cases really are or whether they are really just Lebesgue measure zero in the space of possible true dynamics. If the latter is the case, then these cases may represent interesting examples for contemplation, but cannot be taken seriously as offering hope for overcoming the destructive implications for rational expectations of chaotic dynamics more generally.
After formally presenting the concept of the consistent expectations equilibrium, this paper will present a more detailed outline of the underpinnings of the model of fishery dynamics. Further discussion of implications will conclude this exposition of these examples.
CONSISTENT EXPECTATIONS EQUILIBRIUM
Let a discrete dynamical system be given by p,-G(pet) 
Thus, a CEE is a sequence and a belief process that generates expectations based on an AR (1) process that is self-fulfilling in terms of sample averages and autocorrelations. A case in which a CEE can be chaotic for such an AR(1) process of expectations formation is when the true dynamic is an asymmetric tent map (Sakai and Tokumaru, 1980) , as shown in Fig. 1 (Hommes, 1998 Clark (1990) . Clark (1985 Clark ( , 1990 emphasizes that the modeling of fishery dynamics is among the most complicated and difficult of all such cases of bioeconomic modeling. As a scientist who has also been involved with advising the Canadian government regarding managing the now-collapsed Grand Banks cod fishery, he is also acutely aware of the policy difficulties involved as well.
A number of special peculiarities arise in the case of fisheries. One, understood since the work of Copes (1970) , is that supply curves in fisheries may be backward-bending, one of the few markets where this can happen.** Copes did not present a rigorous derivation of this result but rather imputed it from the problem of open access that had long been identified as a serious problem aggravating the overharvesting problem in many fisheries (Gordon, 1954) . However Clark (1990) Martin-Gonz{tlez (1997) show that considerably more complicated patterns of backward-bending supply curves can exist in systems where the fish are in a predator-prey system. Rosser (1991) discusses various models with more complicated interspecies interactions.
Gordon (1954) originally identified the problem of overharvesting of fisheries due to open access with the existence of "common property resources," an identification that was picked up in the large literature on "the tragedy of the commons" (Hardin, 1968) . It has since been realized (Ciriacy-Wantrup and Bishop, 1975 ) that these are distinct issues with the problems arising specifically from open access. Some common property resources have been and continue to be managed in ways so as to limit access, such as the Swiss alpine grazing fields (Netting, 1976) with some observers suggesting revivals of such traditional community methods of common property management to control access (Ostrom, 1990; Bromley, 1991; Rosser, 1995) .
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The Schaefer (1957) 
This yield function admits of a level of x at which a maximum sustained yield (MSY) will occur which will be at x=k/2. We note that there has long been a conflict between biologists and economists, with many biologists favoring the MSY level of the population as being the goal of optimal public policy, whereas when economic considerations are added to the biological ones in a combined bioeconomic analysis, it is highly unlikely that the MSY is optimal from the economic standpoint.
We now introduce economic variables including:
other than to note that such collapses arise from fishing taking place beyond the MSY level. Gordon (1954) 
This implies that total revenue will be pqEx. Total cost will equal cE, another somewhat simplified equation, given that Clark (1990) has studied cost functions with congestion effects and dynamic models in which capital stock has inertia in the form of the unwillingness of fishers to retire their vessels even when a fishery is obviously being overfished. This latter phenomenon can play an especially important role in the collapse of actual fisheries, but we shall not consider it further here Eoo r/q(1-c/pqk); (8) xoo c/pq.
The left-hand-side terms have the subscript oc because this solution is identical to the socially optimal solution to be presented below when the discount rate is infinite, with the discount rate being given by 5. That is the same as saying that the fishers are totally myopic and are paying no attention whatsoever to the future in their decisionmaking. That can be seen intuitively as being essentially what happens in the open access situation where no individual fisher is taking into account the effects of his own actions. If 5 0 then fishers will treat the far distant future as being equally valuable as today, that is they will be very farsighted.
Clark (1990) presents both an optimal control solution and an optimal social utility solution which yield the same result. Here we follow the optimal social utility case, in which we assume that there exists a non-trivial social utility function (Clark, 1990, pp. 138-139) , U(h). Let P(h) be the *More complicated yield functions can involve depensation and critical depensation (Clark, 1990; Rosser, 1991 (11) subject to x(t) >_ O, h(t) >_ O, c(x, h)-c(x)h, and
The resulting Hamiltionian is given by FIGURE 2 Harvest-Biomass phase diagram.
Pontryagin's Maximum Principle gives
which is strictly true only if h > 0, and
directly as a function of quantity (h). Figure 2 shows a phase diagram in the biomass (x) and harvest (h) space for this system (Clark, 1990, p. 143) . 
Assuming that U' P and setting dx/dt dh/dt 0
Combining this with h-F(x) will give us our basic combined discounted supply and demand system, although we have not yet gotten the supply curve Substituting these into (18) and rearranging gives P-c{(1/qx) + r(1/qx-1/qk)/((5-r + 2rx/k).
We need x as a function of h which can be gotten by solving the quadratic Schaefer equation (6)" x-k/2 +/-(kh/r) 12.
Plugging this into (21) gives us our supply function Figure 3 shows how this supply function varies with 5, with the supply curve being upward-sloping throughout when 0, that is when society treats the far distant future as equally valuable as today, or in the case of the equivalent model based on fishers' behavior derived from their optimal control problem, when the fishers have such a view. The most backwardly bent supply curve corresponds with the totally myopic case of 6=oc, which corresponds to the open access bionomic equilibrium case studied by Gordon (1954) and which is associated with overfishing behavior. We note that the supply curve bends backwards quite quickly at values of the discount rate in the single digits that are empirically and socially meaningful, in contrast with the kinds of discount rates that are necessary to generate chaotic dynamics in golden rule neoclassical growth models (Nishimura and Yano, 1996; Montrucchio and Sorger, 1996; Mitra, 1998) .
The upper right portion of Fig. 4 shows the case of the backward-bending supply curve with a sufficiently inelastic demand curve that then shifts so that there are multiple equilibria even for the static case. This shows the original argument of Copes (1970) who argued that in such a situation, increasing demand could lead to a collapse of a fishery as the equilibrium jumps discontinuously from b to c. Such a result can be modeled by using catastrophe theory and was done so for the collapse of the Antarctic fin and blue whale stocks (Jones and Walters, 1976) , the latter falling from over 150,000 to less than 1000 within the space of a few years during the 1960s (Clark, 1985, p. 6 ). Clark (1985) provides a comprehensive (and lengthy) list of fisheries that have collapsed around the world, although, as we have already noted, a variety of other factors including capital stock inertia have been involved in these tragedies. Figure 4 shows the combined system with the supply and demand curves in the upper-right-hand corner, the Schaefer yield function in the lowerright-hand corner, and Eq. (18) With regard to the specific issues raised by consideration of the fishery dynamics model several points are in order. One is that this modeling effort certainly reinforces much that has already been known: that chaotic or irregular dynamics are more likely as myopia is greater, or as there is a lack of control over access for which the solution resembles the optimal solution with total myopia. This suggests that efforts to make the markets and fishers take a longer term perspective and also to encourage systems to control access should be encouraged, either by reassigning or enforcing property rights, although we have no specific new proposals regarding these difficult and complicated issues.
However the results in this paper do suggest at least one element of optimism that may not have been known by analysts of these problems previously. The implications of the possible existence of observable chaotic CEEs in fisheries suggests that in a world of underlying chaotic dynamics, fishers may be able to mimic the behavior implied by accurate expectations by fairly simple, boundedly rational rules of adaptation. More particularly, in contrast with the catastrophic results arising from some models and situations, it should be kept in mind that chaotic dynamics remain bounded. Thus, if a group of fishers fishing a fishery are actually able to successfully follow an underlying truly chaotic dynamic, even if by doing so through learning to believe in a self-fulfilling chaotic mistake, the results of their doing so will not lead to the collapse of that fishery, which is certainly a desideratum.
